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Summary
Countries have been discussing “various ap­
proaches, including opportunities for using 
markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of,
and to promote, mitigation actions” for several 
years. At COP 17 Durban, Parties decided to es­
tablish a centralised new market-based mecha­
nism (NMM) and to consider establishing a 
“framework for various approaches“ to govern 
decentralised initiatives.  Parties have also dis­
cussed possible use and up-scaling of non­
market based approaches (NMA) in this context.
The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Techno­
logical Advice (SBSTA) in June 2014 invited Par­
ties and observer organisations to another 
round of submissions on how the FVA, NMM 
and NMA could function. The following summa­
rises the submissions by Parties and observers.
This policy brief is an update on JIKO policy pa­
per 2/2012, Current Proposals and Positions on 
New Market Mechanisms and JIKO Policy Brief 
02/2013, Update on Parties' Submissions on "Var­
ious Approaches", and therefore focuses on as­
pects that are new compared to the previous 
discussions. 
Framework for Various Approaches 
The analysis of the FVA submissions focuses in 
particular on the question of what types of ap­
proaches are envisaged to fit under the FVA 
and more generally on where there is a conver­
gence or divergence of views. In addition to the 
question of types of approaches, many submis­
sions revolve around issues of eligibility and 
governance arrangements.
Canada, the EU and New Zealand see the FVA 
as applying to market-based approaches, in 
particular domestic emission trading systems. 
Japan and the Centre for European Policy Stud­
ies (CEPS) see the FVA as umbrella for all mar­
ket-based approaches inside and outside the 
UNFCCC. Finally, the Environmental Integrity 
Group (EIG), the International Emissions Trading 
Association (IETA), the Environmental Defence 
Fund (EDF) and the Institute for Global Envi­
ronmental Strategies (IGES) suggest to cover 
market and non-market approaches. However, 
only IGES touches on the question of how non­
market mechanisms could be transferred, sug­
gesting the development of emission factors 
and methodologies for this purpose. IGES also 
suggests separate registries for transfers of non-
GHG units, such as renewable energy certifi­
cates. In general, none of these submissions go 
into much detail on the types of approaches 
they envisage as falling under the FVA. Finally,
Bolivia maintains its position that only non­
market approaches should be allowed.
On eligibility, the EU, CEPS, EDF and IETA tie the 
full use of the FVA to the adoption of absolute 
emission targets and compliance with related 
MRV requirements. Parties that do not meet 
these criteria would only be able to use mecha­
nisms with ex-post certification of mitigation 
outcomes, such as the CDM or the NMM. CEPS
also suggests that in addition to qualification of 
countries and qualification of units one might 
establish a system to qualify mechanisms for 
participation in international transfers. 
The views on standards differ corresponding to 
the views on what types of approaches should 
be included. While the EU and CEPS envisage 
standards for the eligibility of countries, and in 
the case of CEPS additional standards for the 
eligibility of mechanisms, the Environmental 
Integrity Group as well as the Project Developer 
Forum (PDF), the Designated Operational Enti­
ties & Independent Entities Forum (DIA) and the 
Carbon Markets & Investment Association 
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pass an assessment before transfers could oc­
cur. CEPS, EDF and IETA do not take positions 
on whether compliance with common stand­
ards should be mandatory. Japan notes that it
will use emission reductions and removals 
achieved through its JCM to meet part of its 
emission target. This is stated as a given fact,
without discussing whether there might be a 
need for UNFCCC approval. IGES posits that the 
FVA is a bottom-up process to accommodate 
different mechanisms and thus does not need 
centralised oversight.
As for governance bodies, the Environmental
Integrity Group and the EU envisage the estab­
lishment of international bodies to review con­
formity with international standards. IETA as 
well as PDF, DIA and CMIA see a need for a pro­
fessional implementing body.
In summary, there continue to be different 
views on what types of approaches should fall 
under the FVA. Views range from covering only 
domestic markets and facilitating their linkage 
to covering all types of approaches, including 
market-based and non-market based ones.
However, most of the latter group of submis­
sions do not discuss in detail how exactly non­
market approaches should be addressed. Boliv­
ia continues to posit that only non-market ap­
proaches should be acceptable.
There also continue to be different views on 
whether the FVA should have the function to 
approve decentralised systems or only to facili­
tate their development and operation. Japan 
continues to maintain that it will use emission
reductions and removals from its JCM to meet 
part of its emission target, without any discus­
sion of the legitimacy of such an unilateral ap­
proach.
New Market Mechanism 
There are fewer submissions on the NMM than 
on the FVA. Common themes include the 
NMM’s function, scope and relation to the CDM,
its relation to the FVA, governance, and net mit­
igation.
There is divergence on whether there should be 
an NMM at all and what function it should have.
While most submissions support the creation of 
an NMM, Bolivia reiterates its rejection of mar­
kets and its proposal for a moratorium on the 
use thereof. Most submissions supporting the 
NMM envisage the function of the mechanism 
as certifying mitigation outcomes. The EIG sug­
gests that in addition to certifying mitigation 
outcomes ex-post, the NMM could also have a 
target setting and allocation function similar to 
the Kyoto Protocol. By contrast, IETA suggests 
that the NMM should merely serve to provide 
access to a central harmonised transfer system
and enabling transfer of mitigation units. The 
function to certify mitigation outcomes would 
be served by a new Unified Project Crediting 
Mechanism (UPCM).
While in previous rounds there had been some
discussions to have the NMM functioning sepa­
rately from the FVA, all submissions that discuss 
this issue see the NMM as functioning under 
the umbrella of the FVA. 
On the NMM’s relation to the CDM, the EIG
suggests to have the NMM functioning in paral­
lel to the CDM while CEPS and IETA suggest to 
merge CDM and NMM (in the case of IETA into 
their suggested UPCM). There also is disagree­
ment on whether credits should be generated 
at sectoral level or at project level, with in par­
ticular IETA arguing that project-level crediting 
would be much better for mobilising private 
participation.
There also is divergence on how strict interna­
tional standards and oversight should be. The 
EU demands common standards, approaches 
and methodologies and a system of interna­
tional review and approval. By contrast, IETA 
suggests to ensure compatibility of markets by 
making available market infrastructure tools. 
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start phase based on international guiding 
principles and non-mandatory standards.
On net mitigation, the EU, IETA and the World 
Bank support the use of conservative baselines 
and benchmarks while CEPS strongly cautions 
against addressing net mitigation in the calcu­
lation of crediting. CEPS suggests to instead 
apply a discount at the stage of usage of the 
credits. The EIG also supports a post-issuance 
discount or cancellation by the buyer or host 
country.
Non-Market-Based Approaches 
There are even less submissions on NMA than 
on the NMM and only one, Bolivia’s, that goes 
into some detail. Bolivia goes substantially be­
yond the generic call for NMA in its earlier sub­
missions and proposes a fairly detailed concept 
for a new integrated Mechanism for Climate-
Resilience and Sustainable Development. The 
question is whether its proposed mechanism 
would not essentially duplicate the Green Cli­
mate Fund. Duplication of discussions is the 
main theme of the EU submission, which notes 
that the UNFCCC already has various NMA with 
ample documentation available. The EU also 
takes an opposite stance to Bolivia’s call for ho­
listic and resilient low-carbon sustainable de­
velopment by positing that while co-benefits 
are important, the focus of mitigation instru­
ments should be on decreasing or avoiding 
GHG emissions.
Current Negotiation Process 
The negotiations on future carbon markets did 
not make any progress. A group of countries 
led by Brazil and China blocked any further dis­
cussions, arguing that negotiating concrete 
modalities and procedures for the NMM and 
defining the scope and purpose of the FVA 
would effectively prejudge an outcome of the 
ADP process on a future climate agreement.
Without a clear mandate as to what role mar­
ket-based mitigation instruments will play un­
der the new agreement, these countries were 
not prepared to continue discussions. There­
fore, negotiations on future carbon markets 
came to virtual standstill and it remains to be
seen whether or not the negotiations can be 
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1 Introduction
 
Countries have been discussing “various ap­
proaches, including opportunities for using 
markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of,
and to promote, mitigation actions” for several 
years. At COP 17 Durban, Parties decided to es­
tablish a centralised new market-based mecha­
nism (NMM) and to consider establishing a 
“framework for various approaches“ to govern 
decentralised initiatives.  Parties have also dis­
cussed possible use and up-scaling of non­
market based approaches (NMA) in this context. 
The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Techno­
logical Advice (SBSTA) in June 2014 invited Par­
ties and observer organisations to another 
round of submissions on how the FVA, NMM
and NMA could function. The following summa­
rises the submissions by Parties and observers.1 
This policy brief is an update on JIKO Policy Pa­
per 2/2012, Current Proposals and Positions on 
New Market Mechanisms and JIKO Policy Brief 
02/2013, Update on Parties' Submissions on "Var­
ious Approaches2, and therefore focuses on el­
ements that are new compared to the previous 
discussions. The analysis focuses in particular 
the question of what types of approaches are 
envisaged to fit under the FVA and more gen­
erally on where there is a convergence or di­
vergence of views. 
 







Submissions from observer organisations are available at 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_obser 
vers/items/7482.php
2 Available for download at http://jiko-bmub.de/1152 and 
http://jiko-bmub.de/1293. 
The paper first summarises the individual sub­
missions and on this basis identifies common 
themes. The paper then juxtaposes the differ­
ent views on these common themes. The final
chapter concludes with a brief update of recent 
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2.1 Submissions by Parties 
2.1.1 Bolivia 
The submission by Bolivia covers both the FVA 
and NMA. The NMA aspect will be covered in 
section 4. The Bolivian submission repeats the 
country’s long-standing opposition to market 
mechanisms. Bolivia posits that the Convention 
is non-market oriented and therefore only non­
market-based approaches should by covered 
by the FVA. In addition, all mechanisms should 
fully comply with the UNFCCC’s principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and
the commitments by developed countries to 
take the lead in combating climate change and 
to provide finance, technology and capacity 
building to developing countries.
2.1.2 Canada 
The submission by Canada highlights the estab­
lishment of trading systems by the provinces of 
Ontario and Québec and the linkage of Qué­
bec’s ETS to the Californian ETS. Canada calls for 
recognising the diversity of carbon markets and 
posits that the UNFCCC should provide a trans­
parent framework containing rigorous princi­
ples, standards and guidelines on environmen­
tal integrity. The framework should facilitate the 
fungibility of diverse emissions allowances and 
credits and thereby the linking of carbon mar­
kets at all levels of governance.
2.1.3 Environmental Integrity Group 
According to the Environmental Integrity Group 
(EIG), which consists of Liechtenstein, Mexico, 
Monaco, the Republic of Korea, and Switzer­
land, the FVA should cover activities where a 
country transfers emission reductions to anoth­
er country. It should include market and non­
market based approaches and activities devel­
oped inside and outside the UNFCCC process.
Non-market based approaches would be in­
cluded if they are accountable toward the emis­
sion target of a contributor country, but with­
out issuance of transferable units. Non-market 
based approaches that are only accountable
towards the emission target of the host country 
would not be covered by the FVA. What activi­
ties to include under the FVA would be left to 
the responsibility of participating countries. 
The EIG posits that the FVA would need to in­
clude registries and the use of a common tool
for tracking units, preferably the Kyoto Proto­
col’s ITL. In addition, a comprehensive record­
ing of activities and installations covered by 
mechanisms would be needed to prevent dou­
ble counting. This recording could be done ei­
ther at UNFCCC level or at national level.
Activities would need to pass conformity 
checks before transfers could occur. The con­
formity checks would by performed by an ex­
ecutive body or by a designated national au­
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To ensure data quality, approaches used by Par­
ties should take the experiences from the UN­
FCCC inventory system as well as CDM meth­
odologies into account. If approaches deviate 
from these standards, the country should pro­
vide a comprehensive reasoning as part of the 
conformity checks. 
2.1.4 European Union 
The EU posits that the function of the FVA 
should be to allow Parties with domestic mar­
ket-based systems to internationally account 
for the transfers between these systems based 
on internationally agreed eligibility criteria ap­
plied ex-ante. By contrast, if a Party cannot 
meet the eligibility criteria, transfers would take 
place on the basis of ex-post certification of 
mitigation outcomes through a UNFCCC mech­
anism or mechanisms, such as the NMM.
Eligibility would be established and maintained
through a peer review process undertaken by 
independent experts. An international body 
would be put in place to establish and maintain
eligibility on the basis of the findings of inde­
pendent expert review teams.
The eligibility criteria should address MRV, ac­
counting and transparency rules, but would not 
create rules for domestic systems or a certifica­
tion process for domestic units.  The concrete 
modalities for linking domestic systems would 
be determined by the respective countries,
without UNFCCC involvement.
The eligibility criteria should include: 
•	 Being a Party to the Paris Agreement;
•	 Having a mitigation commitment quan­
tified in terms of t CO2-eq. in accord­
ance with the rules on transparency, 
quantifiability, comparability and verifi­
ability established by the Paris Agree­
ment;
•	 Having a system in place to implement 
the MRV requirements established by 
the Paris Agreement; 
•	 Having submitted the most recently re­
quired national inventory covering the 
period relevant to the accounted miti­
gation;
•	 Having access the an international reg­
istry system; 
•	 Having submitted additional infor­
mation on the generation, transfers and 
use of units.
2.1.5 Japan 
In Japan’s view, the FVA should cover the Kyoto 
mechanisms, the NMM, crediting mechanisms
developed by Parties and domestic emission 
trading schemes that link to each other. 
The Japanese submission mainly responds to 
SBSTA’s invitation to share existing experience 
and lessons learned. It does not go further into 
details on the FVA but instead outlines ele­
ments of Japan’s Joint Crediting Mechanism 
(JCM), including a list of the relevant docu­
ments. Eligibility of projects for JCM crediting is 
established ex-ante through eligibility criteria in 
the individual methodologies. Projects need to 
be validated and verified by third-party entities,
which need to be either CDM DOEs or be ac­
credited under ISO 14065. To prevent double 
counting, JCM project participants need to 
submit a written oath that the project is not 
registered under any other international cli­
mate mitigation mechanism. Third-party enti­
ties need to check double counting during vali­
dation and verification, at least by searching the 
CDM and JI websites. Japan is currently estab­
lishing a JCDM registry to process the issuance 
of credits. Japan states that it will use emission 
reductions and removals achieved through its 
JCM to meet part of its emission target.
2.1.6 New Zealand 
New Zealand highlights that more than 40 
countries have implemented or are considering 
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diversity of instruments will grow. New Zealand
opines that the FVA should be established to 
make it possible for these markets to interact. 
The FVA should include common minimum 
standards and/or best practice guidance to en­
sure environmental integrity as well as re­
quirements for Parties to establish registries 
and transaction logs to prevent double count­
ing and report on how units are generated and 
traded. While use of markets would be volun­
tary for Parties, if a Party decides to generate or 
purchase emission to meet international com­
mitments, it would be obliged to comply with 
the common minimum standards.
New Zealand considers that common stand­
ards, guidelines and best practice guidance as 
well as accounting and governance arrange­
ments can be established step by step on the 
basis of existing mechanisms. New Zealand 
proposes that the Secretariat should identify 
commonly used standards, guidelines or best 
practices, and identify the essential design at­
tributes to ensure environmental integrity and 
where flexibility is desirable or possible.  
New Zealand considers that key UNFCCC re­
sponsibilities should include: 
•	 The setting of rules to ensure environ­
mental integrity;
•	 providing best practice guidance; 
•	 reviewing market mechanisms to con­
firm conformity with the FVA; and 
•	 compiling information on Parties’ mar­
ket mechanisms.  
2.1.7	 Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia notes that the FVA discussion 
emerged from the Bali Action Plan and should 
thus acknowledge the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and should al­
ways be seen in the context of the other Bali el­
ements, including finance, capacity building 
and technology transfer. If a market-based 
mechanism is established, it should not estab­
lish emissions reduction commitments for de­
veloping countries. Emission reduction com­
mitments of developed countries should be 
achieved mainly through domestic efforts and 
the FVA should only play a complementary role.
The FVA should promote transparency of in­
formation and be consistent and build on cur­
rent UNFCCC guidelines for MRV.
2.2 Submissions by Observers 
2.2.1	 Centre for European Policy Stud­
ies 
CEPS highlights that different types of instru­
ments will be used, those developed and oper­
ated by the UNFCCC such as the CDM and JI,
which have been baseline-and-credit mecha­
nisms, and those developed and operated by 
Parties, which could be baseline-and-credit or 
cap-and-trade systems, such as domestic emis­
sion trading systems, Japan’s JCM, or voluntary 
offsetting systems. There will also likely be dif­
ferent types of mitigation commitments, with 
and without absolute caps. With the California-
Québec link and Japan’s JCM there will increas­
ingly be transfers outside the Kyoto Protocol
framework. 
CEPS posits that the FVA should be the umbrel­
la for all mitigation approaches transferred in­
ternationally and ensure that all internationally 
transferred mitigation units or outcomes used 
for compliance under the UNFCCC have envi­
ronmental integrity. The functions of the FVA 
should be to:
•	 Provide information for compliance ac­
counting;
•	 Define protocols and mechanisms to 
avoid double counting; 
•	 Identify what may get counted towards 
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•	 Decide on the mitigation value of out­
comes/units;
•	 Ensure that net mitigation is achieved. 
The FVA should be involved in all aspects that 
determine whether “a ton is a ton” such as MRV 
and issuance, but not be concerned with other 
design issues such as allocation rules of a do­
mestic ETS.
CEPS distinguishes outcomes/units from UN­
FCCC-run mechanisms and outcomes/units 
from non-UNFCCC run approaches. The former
would automatically be valid for compliance 
purposes. Qualification for transfers regarding 
non-UNFCCC run approaches could either be 
done at the mechanism level or at the Party 
level. That is, either a mechanism would have to 
meet internationally agreed eligibility criteria to
be able to export units, or a Party would have 
to. 
The qualification of mechanisms would address 
issues relevant for environmental integrity,
such as baseline setting, accreditation of verifi­
ers, MRV systems, additionality criteria, public
participation, etc. CEPS notes that the qualifica­
tion of mechanisms to transfer units could in­
volve either an approval process or only a 
transparency process. 
Criteria for qualification of Parties could include 
being a Party to the 2015 agreement, having a 
quantified absolute emission target, having in
place an MRV system according to UNFCCC 
rules, and having submitted the most recent in­
ventory. Transfers by Parties that meet all crite­
ria would automatically be deemed good. Par­
ties that do not meet all criteria could only 
make transfers subject to international over­
sight. The international oversight could be ex-
ante, qualifying the mechanism as outlined 
above, or qualifying the units issued, similarly 
to the CDM process. 
Since several approaches may co-exist within a 
jurisdiction, double counting at issuance should 
in CEPS’ view be addressed by the respective 
local regulator. The ITL would be best placed to 
prevent double counting at compliance, but 
countries may be reluctant to allow a UNFCCC 
facility control over bilateral links. This could be
resolved by reporting only net transfers to the 
ITL at the end of each year. 
All countries engaged in transfers would need 
national registries. A UNFCCC-run registry 
should be made available for countries not 
wishing to develop and operate their own reg­
istry. 
As for net mitigation, CEPS posits that the best 
approach is discounting of units at the point of 
use for compliance. Net mitigation should not 
be attempted to be achieved via the way base­
lines are set as the calculation of crediting is al­
ready surrounded by substantial controversy 
and approximations.
2.2.2 Environmental Defence Fund 
EDF suggests that the COP should establish an 
“Integrity Checklist” to guide the design of do­
mestic emission reduction programmes and 
recognise and facilitate linkages among these 
programmes. The “Integrity Checklist” should 
consist of core standards for all domestic miti­
gation approaches and additional standards for 
approaches that involve transfers of emission 
reductions. 
The core standard would include standards for 
MRV and accounting; providing an internation­
ally legally binding framework for those coun­
tries that choose to join it, or alternatively good 
practice guidance for domestic enforcement;
periodic scientific assessment of global mitiga­
tion progress; and good practice standards for 
early action programmes for the period pre­
2020.
The additional standards for approaches that 
involve transfers would include a requirement 
to have caps on economy-wide, sectoral or ju­
risdictional emissions. That is, transfers would 
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lute emission targets. This restriction is to serve 
as incentive for adopting absolute caps. Excep­
tions could be made for low-emitting countries,
who would be provided a project-based access 
to markets. Standards for transfers would fur­
thermore include definitions and fungibility of 
trading units, and transparent tracking, report­
ing and accounting of units and transactions.
2.2.3	 International Emissions Trading 
Association 
IETA envisages that the Parties should be able
to utilise national and subnational market ap­
proaches combined with a Unified Project Cred­
iting Mechanism (UPCM). The UPCM should 
combine and upgrade CDM and JI and the pro­
posals for sectoral crediting into one unified 
system, forming the NMM.
The UNFCCC should make available an infra­
structure consisting of:
•	 Recognition of monitoring and verifica­
tion protocols developed by the UN­
FCCC or in other intergovernmental or 
national forums;
•	 Recognition of standardised emission 
performance benchmarks for key sec­
tors developed by the UNFCCC or at na­
tional or regional levels; 
•	 Standardised issuance procedures; 
•	 A registry and issuance system;
•	 A standardised reporting template;
•	 An accreditation system for verifiers;
and 
•	 A co-benefits checklist.
This infrastructure should serve market-based 
and non-market based approaches. It should be 
overseen by an FVA executive board. The board 
could establish a professional regulatory body 
to administer the new UPCM.
The FVA would need to have two system
checks: 
•	 A system for accounting of units, using 
registries and an ITL and based on 
common MRV standards. This approach 
is to build on the logic of the process for 
Annex I countries under the Kyoto Pro­
tocol. While this does not become clear 
from the submission, this approach is
therefore presumably to apply to gov­
ernment-to-government transfers. 
•	 The second system check would cover 
domestic ETS or other approaches such 
as project-based systems that generate 
reductions measured in emission terms. 
The NMM would be used to organise in­
ternational transfers among such instal­
lation-based systems. Parties would be 
able to establish bilateral or plurilateral 
trading pools with their own rules for 
the operation of their systems. The 
units produced in such pools would be 
transferred through the NMM as serial­
ised units for accurate accounting and 
tracking. Total receipts and transfers of 
NMM units would be recorded in na­
tional reports. 
This approach would apply to countries with 
fixed carbon budgets. Parties without fixed car­
bon budgets could use the UPCM for project­
based reductions based on standardised per­
formance benchmarks.  
Parties that develop their own approaches out­
side the centralised project-based mechanisms
of the UNFCCC would have to supply “relevant
information” to the COP, but this is not spelt 
out further.
2.2.4	 Institute for Global Environmen­
tal Strategies (IGES) 
IGES posits that one of the purposes of the FVA 
should be to recognise mitigation outcomes.
IGES notes that there will probably be a variety 
of types of contributions under the 2015 
agreement, including economy-wide emission 
reduction targets but also non-GHG contribu­
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vidual projects. When accounting for non-GHG 
contributions, the FVA might therefore include 
non-market-based approaches next to market­
based ones.
IGES opines that non-GHG contributions would 
need to be converted into GHG emission reduc­
tions in order to understand the GHG impact. 
The FVA should therefore share and facilitate 
the development of emission factors and 
methodologies for this purpose.
If international transfers are to include non-
GHG units such as renewable energy certifi­
cates, a separate registry would be needed for 
each type of unit.
IGES posits that the FVA is a bottom-up process 
to accommodate different mechanisms and 
thus does not need centralised oversight. Ra­
ther, the FVA should facilitate the process for 
each mechanism to elaborate different ways for 
how to meet standards of environmental integ­
rity. 
2.2.5	 Project Developer Forum / Desig­
nated Operational Entities & In­
dependent Entities Forum / Car­
bon Markets & Investment 
Association 
The joint submission by the Project Developer 
Forum (PDF), Designated Operational Entities & 
Independent Entities Forum (DIA) and Carbon 
Markets & Investment Association (CMIA) posits 
that the FVA should not be a platform for shar­
ing ideas but determine which units or mitiga­
tion outcomes from market and non-market 
based approaches are eligible for international
transfers and compliance. Standards would 
therefore have to have equivalent or higher en­
vironmental integrity than the standards under 
the UNFCCC. The FVA should therefore include 
assessment frameworks covering eligibility cri­
teria and methodologies as well as a registries 
standard to ensure comprehensive tracking of 
units from creation to use. The methodology 
assessment framework would avoid the need 
for project-by-project approval.
The methodology assessment framework 
would only be applied in case a unit is used in­
ternationally for purposes of the UNFCCC (that 
is, not domestically or otherwise), and if there is
no adjustment of the inventories of the two 
transferring countries. 
The FVA should allow for a diverse range of 
mechanisms to be used and participation 
should be open to all stakeholders.
In terms of eligibility criteria, the submission
posits that no activity should be recognised 
that contradicts the provision of Art. 2a(v) of the 
Kyoto Protocol to progressively reduce or phase 
out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives,
tax and duty exemptions and subsidies that run 
counter to the objective of the Convention and 
application of market instruments. 
The FVA should have a policy-making body, an 
implementing body and an appeals body. To 
use existing resources these should be the COP,
the Secretariat, and an appeals body to be ap­
pointed by the COP. To provide guidance in be­
tween COP sessions, the COP should appoint a 
full-time FVA policy body. The policy body 
would not have the authority to implement de­
cisions, nor have authority to reverse decisions 
taken by the Secretariat.
In case international agreements parallel to the 
UNFCCC mandate emission reduction actions 
or influence baselines, such emission reduc­
tions should no longer be usable or the base­
line methodologies should be adjusted, as ap­
plicable. 
2.2.6	 World Bank 
The World Bank submission mainly responds to 
the invitation to share existing experience and 
lessons learned. It notes that nearly 40 coun­
tries and more than 20 sub-national jurisdic­


















Wolfgang Obergassel – Wuppertal Institute 
through instruments including domestic ETS,
taxes, scaled-up crediting and offsetting mech­
anisms. The submission then discusses lessons 
learned on the design elements of mechanisms,
including guiding objectives, definitions of 
scope, governance, rules and procedures, moni­
toring, reporting and verification, and data 
management and registries. The submission 
does not discuss design issues of the FVA.
2.3 Discussion 
From the above summary it emerges that in 
addition to the question of types of approach­
es, many submissions revolve around issues of 
eligibility and whether the UNFCCC should 
have an approval function or only a transparen­
cy function. The following juxtaposes the dif­
ferent views on these issues.
2.3.1 Types of Approaches 
Several submissions see the FVA as applying to 
market-based approaches. Canada, the EU, and 
New Zealand posit that the FVA should facili­
tate linkages among domestic markets with di­
verse allowances and credits. By contrast, Japan 
opines that the FVA should cover the Kyoto 
mechanisms, the NMM, crediting mechanisms
developed by Parties and domestic emission 
trading schemes that link to each other. This
broader understanding is shared by CEPS.
Other submissions envision the FVA covering 
both market and non-market approaches. The 
Environmental Integrity Group suggests to cov­
er all activities where a country transfers emis­
sion reductions to another country, including 
activities developed inside and outside the UN­
FCCC process. Non-market approaches would 
be included if they are accountable toward the 
emission target of a contributor country, but 
without issuance of transferable units. EDF sug­
gests to establish an “Integrity Checklist” con­
sisting of core standards for all domestic mitiga­
tion approaches and additional standards for 
approaches that involve transfers of emission 
reductions. IETA suggests to establish an inter­
national infrastructure for unit transfers that 
should serve market-based and non-market 
based approaches. However, none of these 
submissions goes into details on how exactly 
mitigation outcomes from non-market ap­
proaches might be transferred internationally.
Only IGES touches on this issue, opining that 
non-GHG contributions would need to be con­
verted into GHG emission reductions in order to
understand the GHG impact. The FVA should 
therefore share and facilitate the development 
of emission factors and methodologies for this
purpose. If international transfers were to in­
clude non-GHG units such as renewable energy 
certificates, a separate registry would in the 
view of IGES be needed for each type of unit. 
Finally, Bolivia posits that the FVA should cover 
only non-market approaches, which it defines 
as cooperative mechanisms based on the obli­
gation of developed countries to provide public
finance, technology transfer and capacity build­
ing. Bolivia also opines that adaptation and mit­
igation urgently need to be integrated with 
each other and with development in general to 
achieve climate-resilient sustainable develop­
ment. It suggests to establish a mechanism to 
coordinate the provision of finance, technology 
and capacity building, to facilitate the devel­
opment, achievement and measurement of in­
tegrated targets, and to establish an interna­
tional registry of achieved targets. 
In summary, there continue to be different 
views on what types of approaches should fall 
under the FVA. Views range from covering only 
domestic markets and facilitating their linkage 
to covering all types of approaches, including 
market-based and non-market based ones.
However, most of these approaches do not dis­
cuss in detail how exactly non-market ap­
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continues to posit that only non-market ap­
proaches should be acceptable.
2.3.2	 Eligibility 
While there is general agreement that in princi­
ple all Parties should have some access to 
mechanisms, several submissions suggest to tie 
eligibility for the full use of the FVA to the adop­
tion of absolute emission targets and compli­
ance with related MRV requirements. Parties 
that do not meet these criteria would only be 
able to use mechanisms with ex-post certifica­
tion of mitigation outcomes, such as the CDM 
or the NMM. These submissions include the 
ones by the EU, CEPS, EDF and IETA. EDF sug­
gests that absolute emission targets need not 
apply to a country’s entire economy but could 
also apply to sectoral or jurisdictional emis­
sions.
CEPS suggests a third route for participation, in 
addition to adoption of absolute targets or use 
of mechanisms with ex-post certification of mit­
igation outcomes: Certification of mechanisms.
That is, mechanisms complying with interna­
tionally agreed criteria would be able to make 
international transfers without ex-post assess­
ment of the individual mitigation outcomes.
In summary, there appears to be little disa­
greement on questions of eligibility, at least 
among those countries and organisations that 
have submitted views. The views submitted 
support the Kyoto approach of qualifying either 
countries or mitigation outcomes, with CEPS 
suggesting to add a third approach, qualifica­
tion of mechanisms.
2.3.3	 Scope and Bindingness of Stand­
ards 
The views on standards differ corresponding to 
the views on what types of approaches should 
be included. New Zealand opines that use of 
markets would be voluntary for Parties, but if a 
Party decides to generate or purchase emission 
units to meet international commitments, it 
would be obliged to comply with common min­
imum standards. The EU posits that standards 
should address MRV, accounting and transpar­
ency rules, but would not create rules for do­
mestic systems. This view is shared by CEPS.
As the Environmental Integrity Group envisages 
a broader scope than only domestic markets to 
be included in the FVA, it suggests that activi­
ties would need to pass conformity checks be­
fore transfers could occur. If approaches deviate 
from these standards, the country should pro­
vide a comprehensive reasoning as part of the 
conformity checks. PDF, D&IA and CMIA similar­
ly posit that the FVA should include assessment 
frameworks covering eligibility criteria and
methodologies as well as a registries standard. 
While the above submissions envisage manda­
tory standards, CEPS notes that the qualifica­
tion of mechanisms to transfer units could in­
volve either an approval process or only a 
transparency process. EDF similarly envisages 
providing an internationally legally binding 
framework for those countries that choose to 
join it, or alternatively good practice guidance 
for domestic enforcement. The position of IETA 
is not clear. They posit that Parties that develop 
their own approaches outside the centralised 
project-based mechanisms of the UNFCCC 
would have to supply “relevant information” to 
the COP, but do not discuss whether use of own 
approaches would need to be approved by the 
COP.
Japan notes that it will use emission reductions 
and removals achieved through its JCM to meet 
part of its emission target. This is stated as a 
given fact, without discussing whether there 
might be a need for UNFCCC approval. IGES 
posits that the FVA is a bottom-up process to 
accommodate different mechanisms and thus 
does not need centralised oversight. Rather, the 
FVA should facilitate the process for each
mechanism to elaborate different ways for how 
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The other submissions do not discuss the issue 
of bindingness. 
In summary, there continue to be different 
views on whether the FVA should have the 
function to approve decentralised systems or 
only to facilitate their development and opera­
tion.
2.3.4 Governance Bodies 
A number of submissions touch on the ques­
tion of what governance bodies should be es­
tablished. The Environmental Integrity Group 
posits that the FVA should have an executive 
body that would check the conformity of Par­
ties’ approaches with international standards.
Similarly, the EU suggests that an international
body would be put in place to establish and 
maintain eligibility of countries on the basis of 
the findings of independent expert review 
teams. 
Two submissions from observer organisations 
see a need for a professional body. IETA sug­
gests that the FVA should be overseen by an 
FVA executive board, which in turn could estab­
lish a professional regulatory body to adminis­
ter the new UPCM. PDF, D&IA and CMIA posit 
that the FVA should have a policy-making body,
an implementing body and an appeals body. To 
use existing resources these should be the COP,
the Secretariat, and an appeals body to be ap­
pointed by the COP. To provide guidance in be­
tween COP sessions, the COP should appoint a 
full-time FVA policy body. The policy body 
would not have the authority to implement de­
cisions, nor have authority to reverse decisions 
taken by the Secretariat.
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3.1 Submissions by Parties 
3.1.1 Bolivia 
Bolivia reiterates its rejection of markets and its 
proposal for a moratorium on the use thereof,
criticising the commodification of the environ­
mental functions of Mother Earth, the transfer 
of mitigation responsibility from developed to 
developing countries, double counting and the 
replacement of finance obligations of devel­
oped countries by unpredictable financial re­
sources from markets.
3.1.2 Environmental Integrity Group 
The EIG reiterates its support for the NMM, call­
ing for achieving a net decrease or avoidance of 
global emissions and for the NMM to not re­
place but complement the CDM. Net mitigation 
could be achieved either if reductions occurred 
outside the boundary of a mitigation commit­
ment of a host country or through a post­
issuance discount or cancellation by the buyer 
or host country. As noted above, the EIG sees 
the NMM fall under the umbrella of the FVA.
The EIG sees the NMM as applying pre- and 
post-2020 and discusses whether the NMM is
an offset mechanism or an allocation (cap and 
trade) mechanism. The EIG posits that until 
2020 the NMM would have the function of an 
offset mechanism as there already is an alloca­
tion mechanism for all Annex B Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol. For post-2020, the NMM could 
have both functions and therefore both should 
be elaborated. While rules for the offset func­
tion should build on the experience gained 
from the CDM and JI, the rules for the allocation 
function should build on the rules for Art. 17 of 
the Kyoto Protocol.
3.1.3 European Union 
As noted in the section on the FVA above, the 
EU sees two routes to emission trading, the first 
through trading of mitigation outcomes from 
domestic carbon market instruments and the 
second through a UNFCCC mechanism, the 
NMM, certifying mitigation outcomes. The EU 
sees the second route as applying particularly 
to countries that do not fulfil the eligibility crite­
ria to use the first route and to activities taking 
place outside the boundaries of countries’
commitments. The EU does not envisage the 
NMM being used for compliance purposes be­
fore 2020.
The EU calls for firmly embedding net mitiga­
tion in the NMM. At a minimum, international
commitments and domestic policies of the host 
country should be reflected in the crediting 
thresholds. The EU also suggests to set credit­
ing thresholds on the basis of benchmarks ra­
ther than historic or projected emission levels.
In the EU view these two design features would 
help overcome some of the key shortcomings 
of the CDM, namely the lacking reflection of na­
tional policies in baselines and the inherent dif­
ficulty in assessing additionality against a coun­
terfactual baseline. Net mitigation could either 
accrue to the host country as its own contribu­
tion or to the atmosphere. 
The EU posits that the benefits of the CDM and 
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nisms were  commonly defined and supervised.
The EU doubts whether uncoordinated national
offset systems would deliver the same benefits. 
Participation in the NMM should therefore be 
subject to pre-agreed principles, standards and 
approaches and methodologies, and be sub­
jected to a system of review and approval. 
The EU suggests that if the FVA served to ac­
count for international transfers of units and 
provides for additions to and subtractions from 
commitments of mitigation outcomes certified 
under the NMM, the NMM could fit within the 
FVA.
3.2 Submissions by Observers 
3.2.1	 Centre for European Policy Stud­
ies 
CEPS suggests that the NMM could have several 
windows, such as a project and a sectoral base­
line and credit approach and possible a REDD+ 
window. The CDM should be merged into the 
NMM. The NMM would in particular serve Par­
ties not willing or able to develop their own ap­
proaches or where buyers want to have mitiga­
tion outcomes result from a UNFCCC 
instrument. 
On net mitigation, CEPS posits that this issue 
should not be addressed in the calculation of 
crediting. CEPS argues that the calculation of 
crediting is anyway “an imprecise art” with sub­
stantial controversy and approximations. Add­
ing in net mitigation would only add a further 
level of imprecision. CEPS suggest to instead 
apply a discount at the stage of usage of the 
credits. 
3.2.2	 International Emissions Trading 
Association 
As noted above, IETA proposes to integrate the 
NMM into the FVA to serve two functions: pro­
vide access to a central harmonised transfer 
system and enabling transfer of mitigation 
units. The NMM would thus essentially serve 
the same function as Art. 17 of the Kyoto Proto­
col.   
The function to certify mitigation outcomes 
would be served by a new Unified Project Cred­
iting Mechanism (UPCM). The UPCM would 
merge the previous discussions on sectoral
crediting under the NMM and on CDM reform
to produce a common project-based unit rec­
ognizing achievements against standardized 
sectoral performance benchmarks. IETA prefers 
assessing mitigation at the project level against 
sectoral benchmarks rather than generating 
credits at the sectoral level as suggested in the 
sectoral crediting proposal. IETA posits that the 
project-level model could mobilise private in­
vestment more effectively than the sector-level 
model. Net mitigation would be embedded in
the sectoral performance benchmarks. 
IETA also urges to fully replace the CDM’s pro­
ject-by-project additionality testing by the use 
of sectoral performance benchmarks. IETA fur­
thermore suggests a simplified crediting ap­
proach, such as positive lists, to encourage 
small-scale projects.
Rather than setting eligibility criteria, IETA sug­
gests to ensure compatibility of markets by
making available market infrastructure tools,
such as monitoring and verification protocols,
standardised emission performance bench­
marks, standardised unit issuance procedures, a 
registry and issuance system, a standardised 
reporting template and an accreditation system
for independent verifiers.
3.2.3	 World Bank 
The World Bank suggests to agree on a prompt 
start phase for the NMM to gain experience and 
maintain and improve the already existing mar­
ket infrastructure. The prompt start phase 
should include a prospect for the resulting 
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for compliance internationally. The eligibility of
activities should be very open, covering sub­
sectoral, city, sub-national and national levels 
and explicitly including policy actions. Such an 
open definition of eligible measures would help
to channel support towards actions that would 
have most traction at the national level and to 
reach sectors that have so far typically fallen 
outside the scope of emissions trading, such as 
transport, agriculture, land-use and sustainable 
infrastructure.
Responsibility for the design and implementa­
tion of NMM activities should be allocated to 
the national level. National implementation 
should have flexibility to define complementa­
rity of other policies and sectoral priorities to 
the NMM. The World Bank posits that a com­
bined use of market and non-market based pol­
icies and instruments will be required to reach
out to a broad spectrum of sectors and options. 
Combined use of different financing sources 
should therefore be supported. International
oversight of the NMM should focus on main­
taining environmental integrity and enforcing
compliance of national implementation and of
independent entities with the international
NMM guidelines.
The World Bank lays out the insights it has so far 
gained from its dialogues with developing 
countries that are interested in developing 
market-based instruments. The initiatives under 
consideration range from programmatic ap­
proaches to purely policy-based actions (reform 
of fossil fuel prices and electricity tariffs). Each 
initiative has a very specific approach to the 
role of carbon finance in the overall incentive 
structure. The approaches that are suggested 
by these initiatives to achieve net mitigation are 
related to the definition of baselines and tar­
gets.
The prompt start phase should be based on in­
ternational guiding principles covering envi­
ronmental integrity, net mitigation, transparen­
cy and information sharing. It could also include 
an evolving set of non-mandatory standards on 
baseline setting, accounting, registry, tracking,
verification and other issues. Furthermore, 
there should be a common reporting format to 
facilitate the systematic collection and assess­
ment of the experience gained.
The World Bank sees net mitigation as strongly 
depending on the specific national context.
Crediting thresholds and acceptable levels of 
stringency should therefore be defined by the 
Parties involved. 
3.3 Discussion 
There are fewer submissions on the NMM than 
on the FVA. Common themes include the 
NMM’s function, scope and relation to the CDM,
its relation to the FVA, governance, and net mit­
igation.
3.3.1 Function 
There is divergence on whether there should be 
an NMM at all and what function it should have.
While most submissions support the creation of 
an NMM, Bolivia reiterates its rejection of mar­
kets and its proposal for a moratorium on the 
use thereof. Most submissions supporting the 
NMM envisage the function of the mechanism
as certifying mitigation outcomes, with rules for 
baseline setting, accounting, registry, tracking,
verification and other issues. The EIG suggests 
that in addition to certifying mitigation out­
comes ex-post, the NMM could also have a tar­
get setting and allocation function similar to 
the Kyoto Protocol. By contrast, IETA suggests 
that the NMM should merely serve to provide 
access to a central harmonised transfer system
and enabling transfer of mitigation units. The 
NMM would thus essentially serve the same 
function as Art. 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
function to certify mitigation outcomes would 
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As a further aspect on the function of the NMM,
the EU and CEPS suggest that it would particu­
larly serve countries that are not able or willing
to develop their own domestic emission trading 
instruments. 
3.3.2	 Scope, Relationship to the FVA 
and to the CDM 
While in previous rounds there had been some
discussions to have the NMM functioning sepa­
rately from the FVA, all submissions that discuss 
this issue (EIG, EU, CEPS and IETA) see the NMM
as functioning under the umbrella of the FVA. 
On the NMM’s relation to the CDM, the EIG pos­
its that the NMM should not replace but com­
plement the CDM. By contrast, CEPS suggests 
to merge the CDM into the NMM. The NMM
should in their view have several windows, such 
as a project and a sectoral window. IETA sug­
gests to merge the CDM and the sectoral credit­
ing concept into a new Unified Project Credit­
ing Mechanism (UPCM).
However, contrary to the sectoral crediting 
concept, IETA does not support generating 
credits at sectoral level. They instead propose 
to generate credits at project level on the basis 
of standardized sectoral performance bench­
marks. The World Bank recommends that the 
eligibility of activities should be very open, cov­
ering sub-sectoral, city, sub-national and na­
tional levels and explicitly including policy ac­
tions 
3.3.3	 Governance 
There is divergence on how strict international 
standards and oversight should be.
The EU posits that the benefits of the CDM and 
JI were inter alia achieved because the mecha­
nisms were commonly defined and supervised.
Participation in the NMM should therefore be 
subject to pre-agreed principles, standards and 
approaches and methodologies, and be sub­
jected to a system of review and approval.
By contrast, IETA suggests to ensure compatibil­
ity of markets by making available market infra­
structure tools, such as monitoring and verifica­
tion protocols. The World Bank suggests to 
launch a prompt start phase based on interna­
tional guiding principles and non-mandatory 
standards on baseline setting, accounting, reg­
istry, tracking, verification and other issues.
3.3.4	 Net Mitigation 
On net mitigation, some submissions support 
the use of conservative baselines while others 
support the use of discounting. CEPS most 
strongly posits that this issue should not be ad­
dressed in the calculation of crediting. CEPS ar­
gues that the calculation of crediting is anyway 
“an imprecise art” with substantial controversy 
and approximations. Adding in net mitigation 
would only add a further level of imprecision.
CEPS therefore suggests to instead apply a dis­
count at the stage of usage of the credits. The 
EIG also supports a post-issuance discount or 
cancellation by the buyer or host country.
By contrast, the EU calls for reflecting interna­
tional commitments and domestic policies of 
the host country in the crediting thresholds. IE­
TA similarly suggests embedding net mitigation 
in the sectoral performance benchmarks. The 
World Bank reports that emerging initiatives 
envisage to achieve net mitigation in the defini­
tion of baselines and targets. The World Bank 
sees net mitigation as strongly depending on 
the specific national context. Crediting thresh­
olds and acceptable levels of stringency should 
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4 Submissions on Non-
Market Based Approaches
4.1 Submissions by Parties 
4.1.1 Bolivia 
Bolivia defines non-market based approaches 
as those approaches fostering cooperation in
accordance with the principles of the Conven­
tion on common but differentiated responsibili­
ties and the commitments by developed coun­
tries to take the lead in combating climate 
change and to provide finance, technology and 
capacity building to developing countries. Ac­
cordingly, non-market based approaches in Bo­
livia’s view mean the achievement of low­
carbon development trajectories based on the 
obligation of developed countries to provide
finance and technology.
Bolivia calls for holistic and resilient low-carbon 
sustainable development integrating adapta­
tion and mitigation. Therefore, a Mechanism for 
Climate-Resilience and Sustainable Develop­
ment (CRD) should be established bringing to­
gether all means of implementation under the 
Convention (finance, technology and capacity 
building). The CRD is to be oriented towards the 
achievement of five targets: 
•	 Integrated sustainable development in
harmony with nature including sustain­
able patterns of production and con­
sumption;
•	 Integrated ecosystems management;
•	 Large coverage of emissions reductions 
and limits among sectors; 
•	 Integrated risks-resilience systems; 
• Poverty eradication and reduction of 
gender and peoples’ inequalities.
The CRD is to provide support for the formula­
tion of low-carbon development strategies, co­
ordinate the operationalisation of means of im­
plementation, support the monitoring and 
evaluation of mitigation and adaptation out­
comes, facilitate the measurement of integrat­
ed targets, establish an international registry of 
achieved targets, and share experience be­
tween developed and developing countries. 
4.1.2 European Union 
The EU stresses the importance of all approach­
es that help to combat climate change but 
notes that NMA are already the prevailing and 
default method under the UNFCCC and widely
documented on its website, for example na­
tional actions in the context of the Bali
Roadmap, national reports, the REDD infor­
mation sharing platform, the technology portal,
work under Art. 6 of the Convention, the capac­
ity-building portal and the portal on coopera­
tive initiatives. Therefore, any further infor­
mation sharing should focus on filling gaps or 
organising existing information in new ways to 
facilitate accessibility. Duplication of discus­
sions already taking place under the UNFCCC 
should be avoided. The EU also posits that 
while co-benefits are important, the focus of
mitigation instruments should be on decreas­
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4.1.3 Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia highlights that according to the 
Convention developed countries should take 
the lead in combating climate change while the 
ability of developing countries to undertake 
climate actions depends on the support they 
receive from developed countries. Saudi Arabia
calls on developed countries to promote, facili­
tate and finance efforts in developing countries 
in the fields of education, training and public
awareness, and to enhance and to promote the 
rational consumption and use of natural re­
sources.
4.2 Submissions by Observers 
No observer organisation submitted views on 
non-market based approaches. 
4.3 Discussion 
There are even less submissions on NMA than 
on the NMM and only one, Bolivia’s, that goes 
into some detail. Saudi Arabia merely calls for 
enhanced support from developed to develop­
ing countries. Bolivia goes substantially beyond 
the generic call for NMA in its earlier submis­
sions and proposes a fairly detailed concept for 
a new mechanism. The question is whether its 
proposed mechanism would not essentially
duplicate the Green Climate Fund. Duplication 
of discussions is the main theme of the EU 
submission, which notes that the UNFCCC al­
ready has various NMA with ample documenta­
tion available. The EU also takes an opposite 
stance to Bolivia’s call for holistic and resilient
low-carbon sustainable development by posit­
ing that while co-benefits are important, the fo­
cus of mitigation instruments should be on de­
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5 Conclusions and Outlook
 
This paper has sought to analyse the views of 
Parties and observers on the FVA, the NMM and 
NMA.
On the FVA, the focus was on what types of ap­
proaches are envisaged to fit under the frame­
work and more generally on where there is a 
convergence or divergence of views. In addition 
to the question of types of approaches, many 
submissions revolve around issues of eligibility 
and governance arrangements.
There continue to be different views on what 
types of approaches should fall under the FVA.
Views range from covering only domestic mar­
kets and facilitating their linkage to covering all 
types of approaches, including market-based 
and non-market based ones. However, most of 
the latter group of submissions do not discuss 
in detail how exactly non-market approaches 
should be addressed. Finally, Bolivia continues 
to posit that only non-market approaches 
should be acceptable.
By contrast, there appears to be little funda­
mental disagreement on questions of eligibility, 
at least among those countries and organisa­
tions that have submitted views. The views 
submitted support the Kyoto approach of quali­
fying either countries or mitigation outcomes,
with CEPS suggesting to add a third approach,
qualification of mechanisms.
However, the views on standards differ corre­
sponding to the views on what types of ap­
proaches should be included. While those who 
see the FVA as serving only to facilitate the link­
age of domestic markets (EU and New Zealand) 
envisage eligibility standards for countries, oth­
ers who see the FVA as covering all mitigation 
approaches (EIG, PDF, DIA and CMIA, CEPS and 
IETA) also envisage standards for mechanisms
or individual mitigation outcomes. 
There also continue to be different views on 
whether the FVA should have the function to 
approve decentralised systems or only to facili­
tate their development and operation. While 
most submissions assign an approval function 
to the FVA, Japan continues to maintain that it 
will in any case use emission reductions and
removals from its JCM to meet part of its emis­
sion target, without any discussion of the legit­
imacy of such an unilateral approach.
Only few submission discuss the issue of gov­
ernance bodies. The Environmental Integrity 
Group and the EU envisage the establishment 
of international bodies to review conformity 
with international standards. IETA as well as 
PDF, D&IA and CMIA see a need for a profes­
sional implementing body.
Looking back to previous submissions, one can 
see that the conceptual discussion has ad­
vanced. Ideas are being put forward with signif­
icantly more level of detail. However, there con­
tinue to be significant differences of views on 
the scope of the FVA and whether it should 
have an approval or only a transparency func­
tion, and there seems to be little rapproche­
ment of positions.
There are fewer submissions on the NMM than 
on the FVA. Common themes include the 
NMM’s function, scope and relation to the CDM,
its relation to the FVA, governance, and net mit­
igation.
There is divergence on whether there should be 
an NMM at all and what function it should have.
While most submissions support the creation of 
an NMM, Bolivia reiterates its rejection of mar­
kets and its proposal for a moratorium on the 
use thereof. Most submissions supporting the 
NMM envisage the function of the mechanism 
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gests that in addition to certifying mitigation 
outcomes ex-post, the NMM could also have a 
target setting and allocation function similar to 
the Kyoto Protocol. By contrast, IETA suggests 
that the NMM should merely serve to provide 
access to a central harmonised transfer system
and enabling transfer of mitigation units. The 
function to certify mitigation outcomes would 
be served by a new Unified Project Crediting 
Mechanism (UPCM).
While in previous rounds there had been some
discussions to have the NMM functioning sepa­
rately from the FVA, all submissions that discuss 
this issue see the NMM as functioning under 
the umbrella of the FVA. 
On the NMM’s relation to the CDM, some sug­
gest to have the NMM functioning in parallel to 
the CDM while others suggest to merge the 
CDM into the NMM (or the UPCM suggested by 
IETA). There also is disagreement on whether 
credits should be generated at sectoral level or 
at project level. 
There also is divergence on how strict interna­
tional standards and oversight should be. The 
EU demands common standards, approaches 
and methodologies and a system of interna­
tional review and approval. By contrast, IETA 
suggests to ensure compatibility of markets by 
making available market infrastructure tools 
and the World Bank suggests to launch a 
prompt start phase based on international
guiding principles and non-mandatory stand­
ards. 
On net mitigation, the EU, IETA and the World
Bank support the use of conservative baselines 
and benchmarks while CEPS strongly cautions 
against addressing net mitigation in the calcu­
lation of crediting. CEPS suggests to instead 
apply a discount at the stage of usage of the 
credits. The EIG also supports a post-issuance 
discount or cancellation by the buyer or host 
country.
There are even less submissions on NMA than 
on the NMM and only one, Bolivia’s, that goes 
into some detail. Bolivia goes substantially be­
yond the generic call for NMA in its earlier sub­
missions and proposes a fairly detailed concept 
for a new mechanism. The question is whether 
its proposed mechanism would not essentially
duplicate the Green Climate Fund. Duplication 
of discussions is the main theme of the EU 
submission, which notes that the UNFCCC al­
ready has various NMA with ample documenta­
tion available. The EU also takes an opposite 
stance to Bolivia’s call for holistic and resilient
low-carbon sustainable development by posit­
ing that while co-benefits are important, the fo­
cus of mitigation instruments should be on de­
creasing or avoiding GHG emissions.
The negotiations on future carbon markets in
Lima. A group of countries led by Brazil and 
China blocked any further discussions, arguing 
that negotiating concrete modalities and pro­
cedures for the NMM and defining the scope 
and purpose of the FVA would effectively pre­
judge an outcome of the ADP process on a fu­
ture climate agreement. Without a clear man­
date as to what role market-based mitigation 
instruments will play under the new agree­
ment, these countries were not prepared to 
continue discussions. This position was strongly
contested by others, including the EU, the Um­
brella Group and the Environmental Integrity 
Group. In their views, the discussions on NMM 
and FVA historically predates the Durban pro­
cess and should hence be continued inde­
pendently from it.
While the position of Brazil, China and others 
does have some justification, it is also likely that 
it is motivated to some extent by tactical con­
siderations. Brazil and China may want to hold 
back the market discussions in order to save it 
as a bargaining chip for last minute deals in Par­
is. Historically, the Clean Development Mecha­
nism (CDM) was created in just such a last mi­
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